The European Union is in the process of carrying out the biggest ‘Enlargement’ in its history, bringing in ten new member states to its east and south, to take it up to 25 member states in all.

In central Europe there are the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics. From the south comes the first of the former Yugoslav countries, Slovenia (which is a long way further developed than its erstwhile confederates). For the first time it brings in former parts of the Soviet Union, the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Mediterranean pair of Malta and Cyprus round up the ten.

There are however some dissentient voices from this process. There is a slowly rising tide of those in the current EU, including in the UK, who challenge the wisdom of EU enlargement. Two key pillars of scepticism about enlargement concern its funding, and the state of development of the new member states.

On the first, sceptics point out the likely financial cost of enlargement to the EU. At present the EU distributes what are known are cohesion funds or structural funds to the least economically developed parts of the EU. Clearly, under any economic analysis, large parts of the applicant countries will qualify for this kind of support. So who is going to foot the bill for this? And if all the money is going to the east, will those parts of the current EU which receive them, which include most prominently the Mediterranean south, but also include several parts of the UK, cease to benefit from this support?

Secondly, sceptics point to the failings of the applicant countries. Clearly, in general the economies of the eastern countries are less well developed than in the EU. Just thirteen years after the fall of the Berlin wall their democratic culture is also less well developed than, say, in the UK. And there are concerns about their underlying administrative competence and capacity.

All this leads some sceptics to attack the process of Enlargement. There is no need to hurry, it is said. The applicant countries are simply not yet ready to join the EU. We should not force the pace – but simply continue to wait and see what transpires on our eastern border before committing ourselves.

Those who say this fundamentally misunderstand the importance of EU Enlargement.

Thirteen years ago the Iron Curtain came down, the West had ‘won’ the Cold War, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc expressed unreserved enthusiasm to join western society. In the West we urged them on, and pressed on them the methods and systems of western Europe, which they accepted pretty much without question. The history of the last decade in former Soviet bloc Europe is the history of these countries falling over themselves to implement the systems we told them we required of them. Governments have risen and fallen because they implemented modernisation programmes which often made them profoundly unpopular with their own publics. And why did they do all this? Because the west in general, and the European Union very specifically, made it clear to them that we saw the east as part of Europe as much as the west – that we wanted these countries to join the EU. At every stage we said we saw the eastern countries’ EU accession as just over the next horizon. Those who think the grand statements of prime ministers and presidents about enlargement in 2002 are rash and hasty should look back at the summits of the early 1990’s, when almost exactly the same language, the same promises, were time and again made. The EU has strung its eastern cousins along for a decade, and it is time to make good on this promise.

But this is not just out of some vague sense of moral duty. There are harsh reasons of realpolitik for urgent Enlargement of the EU. The very real cost of the modernisation programmes which have taken place across the eastern half of the continent has had a tremendous impact on public opinion in these countries. Many millions of people have lost their jobs, their homes and their stability as a result of the changes. They miss the social securities which capitalism in an economically uncompetitive area does not provide. Many people in eastern Europe who in 1989 thought capitalism was BMW’s now realise it is Unemployment Centres as well. There are increasing numbers of opinion polls which give majorities in these countries for not joining the EU. It is by no means certain that even once the treaties are signed, the referendums in all these countries will confirm their desire to join.

As these countries move towards deciding that they don’t want to be part of the EU after all, Europe’s window for support for re-unifying itself is slowly closing. If it fails to do so it really will be a historic failure. The division of Europe into a more developed West, and a less developed East which is positively antagonistic to the EU, will be institutionalised.

And the dangers of creating permanently an excluded, economically less developed class of 100 million people on Europe’s immediate doorstep, are clear. Deprived of the opportunity to participate in the European economic project, they would constantly have the wealth and excess of the EU – promised them for a decade and then snatched away at the last minute – dangled before their eyes. The potential consequences for creating conflict of the sort of resentment and economic envy this would engender are obvious.

It would also surely have great consequences for their own internal stability. Removing the raison d’être of the increasingly unpopular reform programmes would certainly see western economic orthodoxy challenged, and it is not very clear what countries exhausted by forty years of communist government and ten of whirlwind capitalism would turn to instead. It is true that the democratic culture does not have the same bedrock of support in these countries as it does here – and the best way of encouraging and consolidating it is to bring it inside the EU where it is part of a common European democratic system, and it is seen to be successful. A functioning but fragile democracy on our doorstep is much more secure inside the EU than outside it.

There are too straightforward trade and economic reasons why western countries such as the UK should want another 100 million or so consumers within the European single market. The benefits in trading to the UK of its membership of the EU over the past thirty years are well established, and significantly increasing the size of that market by incorporating the ten new countries will benefit us as well as them. Anyone who listens to the Archers will recognise the benefits even to fairly small businesses of trading with central European countries!

The EU is founded on the principle of bringing the countries of our continent within a common legal system, so that differences are resolved by law rather than by force. Promoting British trading opportunity and consolidating democracy and human rights in these countries are best achieved by extending this principle to our eastern and southern neighbours. We shouldn’t forget that both the first and the second world wars started with conflicts which are now outside the EU, but which very rapidly engulfed western Europe too. Europe must take its historic opportunity to unify itself and both extend the benefits of peace and prosperity to the new members, and guarantee it for ourselves.

This is the real reason for enlargement. It is not a question of us doing a favour to our neighbours because we sort of vaguely feel we ought to. It is very concretely in our own interest to ensure successful and rapid enlargement of the EU.

Those who talk about the costs of loss of structural funds to ourselves, make reasonable points. Yes, there will be parts of the UK (and especially countries like Spain and Greece) which don’t get a grant because of Enlargement. And yes, too, the political and administrative systems in these countries are far from perfect – although probably rather less so than we sometimes imagine.

But we must not forget the prize of enlargement, or the costs of failing to do it. Division in Europe made the twentieth century the century of pan-European wars. We have, for a short time, a choice: institutionalise that, or prevent it. Yes, I am going to use that word: “historic”.